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SUMMARY
This paper uses cross-national data for 21 OECD nations to examine
whether there is any evidence of a connection between measures of political and
fiscal decentralization and the major, long-term, performance parameters of the
post-war political economy. The findings of what is necessarily an exploratory
analysis of a wide range of policy outcomes suggest that low levels of fiscal
centralization appear to have restrained post-war inflationary pressures and gone
along with higher rates of post-war economic growth. However, no evidence is
found to link fiscal decentralization with post-war labour market performance.
While the balance of evidence indicates that measures of political
decentralization do not have any significant impact on macroeconomic
outcomes, the study confirms the standard finding in the literature that
federalism and other decentralized constitutional arrangements impede the
expansion of the socially protective state.
DECENTRALIZATION AND THE
POST-WAR POLITICAL ECONOMY*
The Question
The question I ask in this paper is whether there is evidence of a connection
between the degree of centralization of the state and the character and
performance of the economy.  With regard to the issue of the expansion of public
expenditure - and, in particular, the growth of the post-war welfare state - there is
now a substantial body of argument and evidence suggesting that political
decentralization in the form of either federalism or other constitutional
arrangements constraining the exercise of direct popular sovereignty have
limited the growth of the post-war public economy.  In contrast, there has been
very little academic analysis of the way in which decentralization  impacts on the
functioning of the economy, with  suggestive insights produced by public choice
theory and a few comparative studies of the links between political and fiscal
structure and macroeconomic outcomes.
Academic analysis notwithstanding, the economic impact of
decentralization has been a hot topic of political debate in many nations at one
time or another during the post-war era. Wherever fiscal powers or policy-
making responsibilities are divided between different  branches of government
or between national and sub-national units, there is likely to be  on-going
controversy on the probable consequences of changing the existing rules of the
game.  In federal systems, such issues are always salient just because the basic
rules of the political process are built around issues of territorial jurisdiction and
because more power for one level of government necessarily means less for
another. In unitary systems, questions concerning the financial resources and
political powers of local governments also emerge, not least because changing
the level at which the political game is played can have an immediate bearing on
its outcomes (ie. Margaret Thatcher's attempt to reduce aggregate public spending
by reducing the powers of local authorities).  
On the whole, the post-war era has seen a major increase in the taxing and
directive powers of central governments at the expense of both the autonomy of
sub-national units and the sharing of powers between different branches and
organs of government. The standard account of such developments has been the
couched in terms of the role of central government as the primary agency for
satisfying the socially protective demands intrinsic to the nature of modern mass
democracy. Despite this, in recent decades, a number of countries - including
Belgium, Italy and Spain and, presently, the United Kingdom - have taken steps
to alter their constitutional arrangements so as to provide greater institutional
guarantees of local and regional autonomy.
When decentralization issues are on the political front-burner, the
protagonists of different positions generally claim that their favoured
institutional arrangements will lead to superior economic performance or, at
least, that the adoption of their opponents' positions will lead to economic
disaster. In the Australian ‘new federalism’ debate of the early 1990s, the
advocates of greater powers for the states argued that a devolved taxing power
would lead to a higher level of 'fiscal accountability', making it more difficult for
governments to evade responsibility for 'economically irresponsible' public
expenditure growth. In contrast, those who wished to maintain the existing
division of powers argued that if the Commonwealth no longer controlled the
'big levers' of fiscal power, it would be unable to achieve either its equity or its
full employment objectives (see Gillespie, 1994; Galligan, 1995).
Arguments of this nature link institutional arrangements (ie. the character
of inter-governmental relations) to policy outcomes, implying that certain types
of arrangements are to be preferred because they are conducive to particular kind
of consequences. As articulated in the political arena, such arguments are
generally given their force by ideological rhetoric rather than by empirical
evidence.  In the Australian debate, the need for central control of the 'big levers'
of economic policy was not established by showing that centralized government
does,  indeed, lead to favourable equity and labour market outcomes, but rather
by an appeal to the Keynesian orthodoxy.  The identification of the autonomy of
sub-national governments with 'fiscal accountability', and the view that both
stand as bulwarks against a public profligacy which undermines economic
performance, was no better empirically grounded, gaining whatever intellectual
persuasiveness it may have had from its resonance with currently fashionable
doctrines of public choice theory.
But to embark on an institutional redesign project as fundamental as that
involved in a reorganization of the territorial and fiscal division of powers is
obviously dangerous unless we have an understanding of the likely policy
consequences of our actions (see Goodin, 1996). Because the institutional
parameters with which we are concerned vary little over time and much as
between nations, the only appropriate strategy for acquiring such an
understanding is by comparing and contrasting the policy experience of nations
with differing degrees of decentralization. One reason for the rhetorical tenor of
the debate in this area is that politicians and their domestic economic policy
advisers tend not to be particularly knowledgeable concerning the policy
experience of countries other than their own, frequently basing their comments
on recent events in individual nations interpreted in terms compatible with the
institutional design proposal they currently favour.
Such an approach is deeply flawed. The whole logic of comparative analysis
rests on the view that single instances prove nothing and that our confidence in
findings should be a direct function of the extent to which they are replicated
across time and space.  Thus, if we are to deploy the evidence of other nations to
link aspects of institutional design to their policy consequences, it must be on the
basis of a comprehensive analysis of the experience of as many relevant (ie.
reasonably similar - see Dogan and Pelassy (1990)) countries as possible. In what
follows, we use cross-national data on the incidence of taxation, on
constitutional arrangements and on the long-term economic performance in 21
OECD countries in order to establish whether and in what ways political and
fiscal decentralization have impacted on the shape of the post-war political
economy.
The Literature
The major difference between academic and political debate in this area is
that the former has been more coherently focused. Political discussion has
tended to focus on proposed changes in the balance of power between levels and
branches of government as potential remedies for whatever economic ills are
presently of most immediate popular concern. The scholarly literature has had
two basic themes: the impact of decentralization on the growth of the state and
its influence on the state's capacity to pursue particular types of macro-economic
policy objective.
Decentralization    and    Small     Government
Although recently claimed as a discovery of the "new institutionalism"
(Pierson, 1995, 449-50), the argument that centralization enhances the size of the
state is one of the oldest and best established propositions in the comparative
public policy literature. Indeed, the very first hypothesis offered by Wilensky to
account for the "diversity and uniformity (of social spending) amongst rich
countries"  in his classic study of the       Welfare    State    and    Equality    argues that
"The greater the authority of the central government vis-à-vis
regional and local units, the higher the welfare state spending and
the greater the program emphasis on equality" (Wilensky, 1975,
52).
Wilensky uses evidence from 22 countries - both OECD and Communist - to
demonstrate a strong negative relationship between social security spending and
an index of centralization in which the central government's share of total tax
revenues weighs more heavily than the constitutional division of powers. Other
studies of the 1970s come to a similar conclusion, although with a focus on the
territorial division of powers rather than on taxation arrangements. Cameron, in
a study  otherwise devoted to examining the role of trade openness in promoting
the growth of the state,  identifies the role of federal institutions in "dampen(ing)
the degree of expansion of the public economy" (Cameron, 1978, 1253), while
Castles and McKinlay (1979, 1980), in research devoted to demonstrating that
"politics matters", note that "the gap between unitary and federal systems is
greater than that between non-right and right-wing systems".
More recent research, using pooled time-series methods, has produced
more contested results. Studies by Korpi (1989) and Pampel and Williamson
(1989) offer almost no support for a variously measured decentralization effect.
On the other hand, an important paper by Huber, Ragin and Stephens  (1993, 721)
conceptualizes territorial decentralization as one of a number of constitutional
arrangements which are seen as inimical to social reform legislation. Using an
additive index of the impediments to majority rule built into the constitutional
structure and a pooled time-series design, these authors demonstrate a strong
negative relationship between constitutional obstacles to reform and both social
security transfers expenditure and total government revenue over a period of
some three decades (  Ibid   , 735-37). Research using a somewhat different index of
"institutional constraints on central state government" developed by Schmidt
(1996, 175) further points to inverse relationships with the growth of big
government, gender equality and labour market policy effort.
The notion underlying all of these arguments is that political and fiscal
arrangements can make it harder or easier to push through programs of public
expenditure. Wilensky sees this as a matter of the obstacles faced by "political
elites who embrace the welfare state" and who are advantaged by a centralization
which means that the battle for reform is fought out in one, highly transparent,
national arena (Wilensky, 1975, 52). Huber, Ragin and Stephens give a slightly
different account of the protagonists in this struggle, with the interests of the
"underprivileged majority" opposed by "minority interests (Huber, Ragin and
Stephens, 1993, 722)" which can use constitutional provisions dividing the
authority of the state as a means of containing the growth of big government.
The story, however it is told, is that institutions matter: that cross-national
differences in the rules by which the game is played are  factors highly  relevant
to the diversity of post-war  outcomes concerning the size of the state.
Decentralization    and   the      Macro    Economy
It is possible to identify two strands of argument linking political and fiscal
decentralization to the character of macro-economic objectives.  One is a set of
propositions emanating from public choice theory, which suggest that, in order
to  contain the supposedly revenue-maximizing  proclivities of national
governments,  it is necessary  that there be restraints on the capacity of the central
state  to take certain kinds of policy initiatives. The most familiar argument in
this mode is that, because governments have an inherent tendency to put a
higher priority on revenue maximization than on monetary stability, they
cannot be trusted with the control of monetary policy, which is more
appropriately located in the hands of independent central banks. In a somewhat
similar vein, the "dispersal of fiscal authority among differing levels of
government" has been seen "as a means of controlling Leviathan's overall fiscal
appetites" (Brennan and Buchanan, 1980, 181). Although motives of this kind do
not appear to have been to the forefront in recent moves towards greater
territorial devolution of powers in countries like Belgium, Italy and Spain, the
notion that decentralized government is more economically efficient, as well as -
or because of - having a less imperial growth potential, has been the staple
argument of those favouring further fiscal decentralization in existing federal
states (see Walsh, 1989).
Public choice theory starts from a neo-classical and deductivist framework
very different from the inductivist, comparative public policy, approach which
has characterized research focusing on the links between decentralization and
the growth of the socially protective state. More in the latter tradition is a second
strand of argument, which points to differing degrees of freedom for macro-
economic policy manoeuvre in countries characterized by differential degrees of
fiscal decentralization. Using a comparative case-study approach, Scharpf argues
that the capacity of national governments to utilize demand management
techniques in a Keynesian manner to boost economic growth and
unemployment is a function of the existing magnitude of public budgets and the
extent to which they are controlled by the central government (Scharpf, 1991, 212-
13). The point is that governments cannot readily stimulate an economy they do
not control. Building on Scharpf's notion of differential degrees of 'fiscal
difficulty', Busch (1993, 65-69) further argues that nations face a real economic
performance trade-off, since increases in aggregate demand facilitated by large
public budgets and a centralized fisc are likely to be a source of substantial
inflationary pressures. Using data for 17 OECD countries, Busch demonstrates
that countries manifesting the preconditions for effective Keynesian control of
the economy had significantly higher rates of inflation than other OECD
countries in the period 1973-86.
It is important to note that hypotheses concerning the macroeconomic
implications of fiscal and political decentralization have been less fully explored
than those relating to the growth of the state. Public choice theory is about the
logic of economic institutions, and has been little concerned with the empirical
testing of hypotheses. Almost the only major concern of that school of thought
to be taken up seriously by empirical economic policy research has been the
insight that central bank independence is linked to lower rates of inflation.
Some of this work has involved sophisticated econometric modelling (see
Alesina, 1989; Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini, 1991). In contrast, the work on
'fiscal difficulty' we have briefly reviewed here must be seen as having a rather
more tentative character, since it does not use appropriate modelling techniques
to take account of other obviously crucial factors conditioning macro-economic
performance.
The Research Design
The research design employed here involves assessing the impact of a
variety of measures of political and fiscal decentralization on robust models
accounting for  substantial degrees of cross-national variance in the long-term
performance parameters of the post-war political economy.
Measures    of     Decentralization    
Five measures of decentralization are featured in Table 1. Sources and notes
to that table provide precise details of the operationalization of each variable and
our presentation here merely highlights some of the implications involved in
the use of the various measures.
Federalism.  This measure is largely unproblematical. Six countries - three
Anglo-American and three German-speaking - have been federations
throughout the post-war period. Belgium became a federal state in 1993, but
this was too late to affect any of the performance measures used in this study.
Constitutional  Structure . This is a measure developed Huber, Ragin and
Stephens (1993) and updated by Schmidt (1996) to include the countries of
Southern Europe.  The measure seeks to capture the way in which
constitutional structures serve to limit the strength of democratic majorities
by giving privileged access to other political actors in the policy process. Such
mechanisms as federalism, directly elected presidents, territorial
constituencies, strong second chambers and referenda all constrain (or
function as veto-points against) the legislative will of the majority. There are
ambiguities concerning the measurement of two cases. The new Swedish
constitution of 1970 abolished a reasonably strong upper house. However,
since Sweden has been unicameral for most of period under review here, the
Schmidt coding stands. Until the restoration of democracy in 1976, Spain is
appropriately coded as having no veto-points. We retain the Schmidt
operationalization based on Spain's present democratic status, but note that
Table 1: Measures of Political and Fiscal Decentralization
Country
Australia
Canada
Ireland
New Zealand
UK
USA
Denmark
Finland
Norway
Sweden
Austria
Belgium
France
Germany
Italy
Netherlands
Greece
Portugal
Spain
Switzerland
Japan
OECD Average
Federalism
1
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
Constitutional
Structure
4
4
0
0
2
7
0
1
1
0
2
1
2
4
1
1
2
0
1
6
2
2.0
Fiscal
Decentralization
21.3
44.7
4.4
6.4
8.8
28.8
29.9
24.1
20.4
32.0
21.6
4.8
8.5
30.8
2.6
10.0
4.3
4.4
8.6
39.9
25.0
18.1
Fiscal
Centralization
78.6
43.3
82.2
93.3
73.9
41.0
66.9
59.5
54.4
49.2
51.8
62.2
48.9
33.4
60.8
56.4
65.7
70.1
50.2
27.0
46.6
57.9
Fiscal
Difficulty
4.1
5.8
3.1
•
3.4
7.9
2.8
3.8
3.5
3.6
4.2
3.3
4.7
6.7
4.4
3.4
4.5
4.3
6.2
11.3
7.3
4.9
Sources and Notes: Federalism is coded: 0 = no, 1 = yes. Constitutional Structure from
Huber, Ragin and Stephens (1993) as  modified by Schmidt (1996). This variable is an
additive index where: Federalism 0 = no, 1 = weak, 2 = strong; Parliamentary/presidential
government: 0 = parliamentary, 1 = president or collegial executive; Proportional
representation/single-member districts: 0 = proportional representation, 1 = modified
proportional representation, 2 = single-member, simple plurality system; Bicameralism: 0 = no
second chamber or second chamber with very weak powers, 1 = weak bicameralism, 2 =
strong bicameralism; Referendum: 0 = none or infrequent, 1 = frequent.  Fiscal
Decentralization is equivalent to the share of state and local taxes in total revenue,  data
averaged from 1973, 1983 and 1992, from OECD, Revenue Statistics, various dates. Fiscal
Centralization  is equivalent to central government revenue as a share of total revenue, data
averaged from 1973, 1983 and 1992, from OECD, Revenue Statistics, various dates. Fiscal
Difficulty is equivalent to the reduction in the central government's revenue share that would
be required to reduce  the total receipts of government by 1 per cent of GDP. Data on the
central government share of revenues from the previous column of the table; average receipts
of government  for 1973, 1983 and 1992 calculated from OECD, Historical Statistics, various
dates.
for all performance measures, bar unemployment, it might have been more
appropriate to give Spain a score of .5 had other cases in the index had been
differentiated in this manner.
Fiscal Decentralization . This measure, which is simply the sum of state and local
taxes as a percentage of total tax revenue, is the simplest and most
unambiguous measure of the territorial decentralization of the fisc. Other
taxes are levied on behalf of supranational bodies (the EU), by central
governments or by agencies with national scope (social security funds). The
revenues listed in the column 3 of Table 1 derive exclusively from taxes
levied at a sub-national level. Since the share of social security taxes is likely
to be higher where social security spending is higher, a negative relationship
between fiscal decentralization and welfare state expenditures may well be in
some part endogenous. Since we are attempting to capture the reality of fiscal
centralization over the post-war period as a whole, our measure is based on
averaging OECD data for the years 1973, 1983 and 1992.
Fiscal Centralization. It is important to distinguish fiscal decentralization as
defined above from fiscal centralization or, as I have elsewhere called it,
'discretionary fiscal centralization' (see Barwise and Castles, 1991).  Fiscal
centralization as defined here measures the share of the tax take going to the
central government. Because it also excludes supranational and social
security taxes, it is not simply the mirror-image of fiscal decentralization (see
correlation matrix in Table 2 below). The reason for the label 'discretionary'
preceding the centralization variable rests on an argument analogous to that
underlying Scharpf's 'fiscal difficulty' hypothesis: namely, that the central
government cannot manipulate social security and supranational taxes with
the same ease as it does the main categories of tax under its direct control. So
a demonstrated link between fiscal centralization and economic performance
would imply that central control of the fisc has a direct effect on policy
outcomes.  In contrast to fiscal decentralization, the predicted positive
relationship between fiscal centralization and high levels of social spending
would not be endogenous. The exclusion of social security taxes from the
central category makes such a link a priori  less rather than more likely. As in
the case of fiscal decentralization, the data here is averaged for the years 1973,
1983 and 1992.
Fiscal Difficulty.  There is no routinely available data on the central
government's share of public expenditure, so, appropriately enough, we use
the available OECD data on the share of revenues accruing to central
government to measure fiscal difficulty on the revenue rather than the
expenditure side of the budget.  Thus, rather than following Scharpf's lead in
assessing how difficult it is for national governments to deliver demand
stimulus through central government  public spending,   we look at the
implications of delivering a comparable stimulus to the economy via a
central government tax cut.  The figures in the final column of Table 1 show
the percentage by which the share of central government taxes would have to
fall in different countries in order to secure a one per cent of GDP increase in
demand. There are complex and conflicting issues of causality and
endogeneity here. On the one hand, the very construction of the variable is
such that countries experiencing substantial post-war growth of the state will,
all other things being equal, have a lower level of fiscal difficulty than
countries which did not. On the other hand, the logic of the fiscal difficulty
hypothesis itself suggests that countries with small tax states are likely to find
it difficult to reduce the size of the state further. As in the case of our other
fiscal measures, the data presented here involves averaging over the years
1973, 1983 and 1992.
Two points should be emphasized. First, it is apparent that endogeneity
could be something of a problem in research linking fiscal shares with spending
outcomes. However, it should be noted, that the three measures of
decentralization which have actually featured in the studies of the size of the
state reviewed above - tax centralization, federalism and constitutional structure
- are not affected by this problem. There would appear to be no endogeneity
problems in using any of our five decentralization measures in modelling
aspects of macro-economic performance. Second, it is important to stress that,
while the measures presented here in the context of the overall development of
post-war economic policy are either substantially invariant (federalism and
constitutional structure) or involve averages for different time-points (the
measures relating to decentralization of the fisc), in reality degrees of
decentralization alter over time. More detailed future research on this topic will
need to take that into account.
We conclude this discussion of decentralization measures by seeking to
establish the extent to which they capture the same dimension of the functioning
of the modern state. Table 2 presents a simple correlation matrix for the five
variables, which shows the strongest affinities to be between federalism and
constitutional structure (.83), fiscal centralization and fiscal difficulty (.77) and
fiscal difficulty and constitutional structure (-.77).
Table 2: Correlation Matrix of Political and Fiscal Decentralization Variables
Federalism Constitutional Decentralization Centralization Difficulty
Federalism 1
Constitutional .83 1
Decentralization .64 .54 1
Centralization -.48 -.57 -.63 1
Difficulty .56 .77 -.51 -.77 1
The first two of these linkages are, in some part,  definitional, since
federalism is used in the elaboration of the constitutional structure index and
fiscal centralization in the elaboration of the fiscal difficulty measure. There are
no obvious definitional reasons why constitutional structure and fiscal difficulty
should be so closely akin. A .70 correlation implies that two variables share half
the same variance. Given that these are all supposedly measures of the
decentralization of the state, it is appropriate to note that most of the other
linkages identified in Table are quite moderate. Indeed, the .64 correlation
between federalism and fiscal decentralization is the strongest link between
political and fiscal measures proper (ie. excluding the hybrid fiscal difficulty
term) and it could very well turn out that these two dimensions of
decentralization have substantially different implications for policy outcomes.
Measures    of     Outcom       es
Table 3 provides data for four major parameters of the post-war political
economy. They are standard topics for political economy research and do not
require detailed explanation. Three are measures of the fulfilment of the three
main objectives of contemporary economic policy-making: high economic
growth, low inflation and low unemployment. The fourth measure of total
social protection seeks to capture the most important dimension of the growth in
the size of the post-war state.  The definition of the macro-economic
performance variables is in accord with standard practice. The social protection
variable comes from the OECD's social expenditure database, and is the sum of
social security transfers, welfare service provision and health spending. Data
sources and definitions are to be found in the notes to Table 3.
The precise operationalization of these four measures for this study
involves certain choices. A narrow focus on specific years chosen because they
are likely to demonstrate the operation of hypothesized causal mechanisms
might be one approach. Another - and that chosen here - is to examine variables
over the long-term, allowing us to ascertain the extent to which decentralization
variables have influenced post-war performance as a whole. In so far as we locate
strong associations in the data, that leaves for further research the question of
whether  such impacts have been constant over the whole period or focused at
particular junctures. Because the thrust of comparative labour market research
has been on the rise of unemployment since the mid-1970s, we adopt a
comparable restriction of focus.
In the case of both economic growth and inflation, our operationalization is
in terms of annual average rates of change: ie. the annual average rate of per
capita economic growth and the average annual rate of increase in the consumer
price index. In the case of both unemployment and the rise of the socially
protective state, we are concerned with the shaping role of decentralization on
the trajectory of post-war change, so these variables are measured in terms of the
increase (or decrease) in the values of these variables over specified periods of
time. In the case of unemployment, change is calculated as the difference
between averages for periods rather than particular years. This is because
unemployment is a largely cyclical phenomenon and cross-national comparisons
are necessarily distorted where countries enter and leave recessions at different
times. The data here measure the change between labour market performance in
the recession following the First Oil Shock and that of the early 1990s.
Methodology
Although exploratory research in new areas and with novel variables is
often justified in using case-study methods and in arguing for a priori
conclusions on the basis of bivariate findings, such conclusions are necessarily
preliminary. It is clear that, in a multi-causal universe, hypotheses are only fully
grounded in so far as they are tested in the context of models which substantially
account for the phenomena in question. Where the focus of research is on
determining the causal impact of particular variables or categories of variables,
Table 3: Performance Parameters of the Post-war Political Economy in 21 OECD Nations
Country
Australia
Canada
Ireland
New Zealand
UK
USA
Denmark
Finland
Norway
Sweden
Austria
Belgium
France
Germany
Italy
Netherlands
Greece
Portugal
Spain
Switzerland
Japan
OECD Average
Per Capita
Economic
Growth,
1960-1992
1.9
2.5
3.3
1.1
2.4
1.9
2.3
2.6
3.2
1.9
2.9
2.8
2.7
2.5
3.2
2.4
3.7
4.3
3.6
1.6
5.1
2.8
Average Rate of
Inflation,
1960-93
6.5
7.6
8.1
8.2
7.6
4.9
6.7
7.2
6.4
6.8
4.4
4.7
6.3
3.5
8.5
4.4
12.0
12.6
9.7
3.9
5.2
6.9
Increase in
Unemployment
1974/1979-
1990/1994
4.5
3.0
7.4
•
4.2
-1.9
2.9
7.6
3.8
3.3
1.9
3.5
6.0
3.5
4.5
1.9
6.6
-.9
14.0
•
.5
4.0
Increase in Total
Social Protection
1960-1993
9.0
10.6
11.4
12.1
13.2
8.3
•
26.6
21.5
27.2
9.9
•
15.3
10.2
11.9
18.5
10.2
•
•
15.7
8.4
14.1
Sources: Per Capita Economic Growth, 1960-1992  is the annual average increase in per capita
GDP and is calculated from an update of Summers and Heston (1991). Average Rate of
Inflation, 1960-93 is equivalent to the average annual rate  of increase of the consumer price
index over the period. Data is from OECD, Historical Statistics, 1960-1993, 1995. Increase in
Unemployment, 1974/1979-1990/1994  is the increase in the average unemployment rate
between the period 1974 to 1979 and 1990 to 1994.  Data from OECD, Historical Statistics,
1960-1994, 1996. Increase in Total Social Protection, 1960-1993 is the percentage point increase
in the sum of social security, welfare services and public health spending as a proportion of GDP
over the period 1960 to 1993. Data for 1960 is from OECD (1994); data for 1993 is from OECD
(1996).
this obviously involves a substantial task of data-gathering, since models must
be elaborated across a wide range of subject-areas.
Such modelling exercises are also methodologically problematic, because of
the very considerable number of explanatory variables which must be examined
in order to do justice to the relevant scholarly literature. The difficulty is that the
low case numbers available for cross-national research permit us only to
investigate a limited range of hypotheses using conventional cross-sectional
designs, while the use of pooled time-series designs using multiple dependent
variables makes an already major data-gathering exercise quite prohibitive in
terms of cost and energy. To get around these difficulties, I have relied on the
extensive database gathered in the context of my recent work on the
determinants of post-war public expenditure development and labour market
trends (Castles, 1998). I have also utilized the same research strategy that was
used in this work, combining a simple cross-sectional design with bivariate
analysis as a means of exploring the full range of hypotheses suggested in the
literature, and using a variant of stepwise regression  to generate models
maximizing levels of explained variance (adjusted R2) on the basis of variables
satisfying a minimum criterion of statistical significance (t > 2.00). The standard
approach to cross-sectional investigation which excludes possible explanations by
failing to test potentially relevant hypotheses rests on what I call
'disingenuousness by omission'. My own approach also clearly leads to some
degree of model misspecification, but does allow discussion of a much wider
range of potentially relevant hypotheses. It is transparent in a way the standard
approach is not.
The precise application of this methodology in the present study involves
the elaboration of stepwise regression models for each of the political economy
variables itemized in Table 3.  In addition to the criteria used for model
specification in my earlier work, I further take account of the robustness of the
findings  by establishing whether the statistical significance of terms is a function
of the inclusion of particular cases in the analysis.  Having elaborated basic
models with a capacity to account for much of the cross-national variance in each
performance parameter, I include each of our measures of political and fiscal
decentralization in turn, seeking to establish whether they are themselves
statistically significant and robust. Basic models for each performance parameter,
together with successive elaborations of the effects of the decentralization
measures,  are reported in Tables 4 to 7 respectively and are discussed below.
The Models
Economic     Growth
Of a long listing of hypotheses concerning the factors influencing post-war
economic growth, including catch-up (initial level of real GDP), investment
levels and investment growth, employment growth, corporatism, party control
and a wide variety of measures of change in different categories of public
expenditure (see Castles and Dowrick, 1990),  the basic economic growth model as
shown in Table 4 consists of a single, but enormously strong, term for catch-up.
The notion that post-war economic growth has been characterized by a powerful
tendency to convergence is now well established (Dowrick and Nguyen, 1989)
Table 4: Economic Growth Models
BASIC MODEL
INTERCEPT
1960 REAL GDP  PER CAPITA
Adj R2 = .767
Coefficient
4.865
-0.0003662
Standard Error
0.00004483
t-Value
8.168
Sources :  Economic Growth from Table 3. 1960 Real GDP Per Capita from Summers and Heston (1991).
Notes: 21 cases in regression.  Adding an investment  growth term to the model produces the following
equation: 1960-1992 Economic Growth = 3.872 - .0003131 (.00004240) 1960 Real GDP Per Capita + .204 (
(.071) 1960-1992 Change in Gross Fixed Capital Formation. Figures in parentheses are standard errors.  Adj
R2 = .831. 1960-1992 Change in Gross Fixed Capital Formation is the average annual percentage increase in
Gross Fixed Capital Formation from  OECD, Historical Statistics, 1960-1992, 1994.
BASIC MODEL + FEDERALISM
FEDERALISM
Adj R2 = .779
Coefficient
.364
Standard Error
.254
t-Value
1.432
Sources: Federalism  is from Table 1. Notes: 21 cases in regression.
BASIC MODEL + CONSTITUTIONAL
STRUCTURE
CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE
Adj R2 = .824
Coefficient
.143
Standard Error
.053
t-Value
2.688
Sources:  Constitutional Structure is from Table 1.  Notes: 21 cases in regression.  The t-value for
Constitutional Structure  is below 2.00  if New Zealand is  excluded from the regression.
BASIC MODEL +  FISCAL
DECENTRALIZATION
FISCAL  DECENTRALIZATION
Adj R2 = .827
Coefficient
.023
Standard Error
.008
t-Value
2.762
Sources  Fiscal Decentralization  is from Table 1.  Notes: 21 cases in regression. The t-value for  Fiscal
Decentralization is below 2.00  if New Zealand or Japan  are  excluded from the regression.
BASIC MODEL + FISCAL
CENTRALIZATION
FISCAL CENTRALIZATION
Adj R2 = .845
Coefficient
-.017
Standard Error
.005
t-Value
3.267
Sources :  Fiscal Centralization is from Table 1.  Notes: 21 cases in regression.
BASIC MODEL + FISCAL DIFFICULTY
FISCAL  DIFFICULTY
Adj R2 = .832
Coefficient
.109
Standard Error
.042
t-Value
2.633
Sources :  Fiscal Difficulty is from Table 1.  Notes: 20 cases in regression (no data for New Zealand ).  The t-
value for Fiscal Difficulty is below 2.00 if Japan is excluded from the regression.
and is graphically demonstrated by the extremely high t-value for the
relationship between the catch-up term, 1960 GDP per capita, and subsequent
rates of economic growth.  All other potential explanations pale beside this
pattern of convergence, although the change in gross fixed capital formation, our
measure of investment growth, does produce a further significant term  for the
full sample of 21 countries, which is shown in the notes to the basic model. It
does not feature as part of the basic model as such, because the finding is not
robust, depending exclusively on the coincidence of very high levels of
investment and exceptionally good performance in Japan, the OECD's economic
growth phenomenon.
Successively introducing our five decentralization measures into the single
term basic model for economic growth reveals that no less than four of them are
significantly related to economic growth, with federalism the one exception. In
all instances, the signs of these terms indicate that decentralized political and
fiscal arrangements are associated with superior long-term economic growth
rates. However, only in the case of fiscal centralization is the resulting model a
robust one, with the other decentralization terms ceasing to be significant when
either Japan and/or New Zealand are excluded from the analysis. Whereas
Japan's influence on these models stems from its exceptionally strong growth
performance, New Zealand's arises from the coincidence of the weakest growth
trajectory  in the OECD and a constitutional structure and fiscal arrangements as
centralized as any in the advanced world.
These findings are somewhat surprising. Economic growth is not amongst
the areas in which the literature is explicit in suggesting a link between
decentralization and favourable economic performance, although notions of
efficiency gains from restraining Leviathan's tendency to produce a revenue
surplus might be interpreted as being compatible with such an outcome.
Moreover, superficially, the findings conflict with our casual impressions of the
post-war growth record of many OECD nations. Looking to one extreme,
Switzerland and the USA have amongst the poorest growth records in the OECD,
but they are federal, have more constitutional veto-points than any other OECD
countries, have exceptionally high levels of state and local taxes, are almost at the
bottom of the distribution in respect of the central tax take and have the two
highest readings for fiscal difficulty. At the other extreme,  Ireland and Portugal
exhibit opposite characteristics
Moreover, these are not  impressions derived from just a few extreme cases.
Four of our five measures  produce bivariate correlations with growth which are
signed as indicating that decentralization is inversely related to economic
performance. The exception is fiscal decentralization, but even here the
correlation is negligible (-.04). If nothing else, this strongly underlines the
methodological point that only full model specification provides us with the
evidence required for well-grounded conclusions. Turning again to our
examples at the extremes, it is impossible to know what is going on in respect of
the economic growth performance of these countries until we have discounted
the fact that  Switzerland and the USA started out the post-war period very rich
and that Ireland and Portugal started out very poor. If we don't know how much
catch-up matters, we can't establish how much political and fiscal
decentralization matter either.
Inflation
The basic model for inflation consists of three terms: corporatism, sectoral
transformation and the growth of civilian public consumption expenditure.  For
the regression reported here, the latter term is not robust and is dependent on
the inclusion of Japan in the analysis. The model is, however, reported in this
form, since the term for public consumption becomes wholly robust in a number
of the subsequent specifications including measures of decentralization. As in
the case of economic growth, this model has strong resonances with the standard
literature in the field. The role of corporatism as a factor containing inflationary
growth has produced a huge literature (see eg Bruno and Sachs, 1985; Crouch,
1985; Crepaz, 1992), while the role of public spending has been much demonized
by the government overload and public choice schools of thought. Public
consumption expenditure which is focused substantially on public service
provision might be thought of as particularly conducive to inflation because of
an inherent tendency to low productivity growth in the service sector (see
Baumol, 1967). Finally, the strong positive link between inflation the sectoral
transformation, measured as the shift from agricultural employment into other
sectors of the economy, confirms the standard view that rapid economic
development is a source of  an overheated economy.
It is also appropriate to mention two variables which do not feature in the
analysis, both of them, according to the Busch's paper earlier cited (Busch, 1993),
important determinants of inflation. They are central bank independence and a
measure of distributional conflict, the strike coefficient. In the former case, we do
not have data for Ireland or the countries of Southern Europe and cannot
replicate his findings for our full sample of cases. Busch's analysis suggests that
there is a strong positive connection between central bank independence and
decentralization, so that it is possible that any links we might establish between
our measures and inflation are really to be attributed to the way in which central
banks function. For the 17 countries for which we have  a coding of the degree of
bank independence (Busch, 1993, 60),  the correlation with federalism is a
moderate .54 and there are comparable degrees of association with constitutional
structure (.51) and fiscal decentralization (.49). The correlations with fiscal
centralization (-.78) and fiscal difficulty (.67) are  still stronger.
The omission of a distributional conflict variable, despite a bivariate
relationship between the post-war strike coefficient (for a variable definition, see
footnote 1 below) and inflation which is stronger  (.82) than any of the terms
featuring in the basic model, is in order to reduce the risk of endogeneity. The
problem is that, whilst distributional conflict is undoubtedly a trigger for
inflationary wage rises, inflation itself is often part of a vicious circle  fostering
further union militancy and strike activity. We do not believe that the omission
of an explicit distributional conflict term from our modelling leads to undue
misspecification of the relationships involved, because we have reason to think
that two of the variables figuring in our basic model - corporatism and sectoral
transformation - are amongst the main factors conditioning whether
distributional conflict emerges in the first instance.1
Table 5: Inflation Models
BASIC MODEL
INTERCEPT
CORPORATISM
1960-1993 SECTORAL
TRANSFORMATION
1960-1993 INCREASE IN CIVILIAN
PUBLIC CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURE
Adj R2 = .648
Coefficient
2.008
-1.115
.166
.307
Standard Error
.346
.032
.111
t-Value
3.226
5.185
2.757
Sources: Inflation from Table 3.  Corporatism  scores from Crepaz (1992),  with data for Greece, Portugal
and Spain supplied by Professor Hans Keman of the Free University of Amsterdam;. 1960-1993 Sectoral
Transformation is equivalent to the percentage of the employed population leaving the agricultural sector,
calculated from  OECD, Historical Statistics, 1960-1993, 1995. Increase in Civilian Public Consumption
Expenditure calculated from  OECD, Historical Statistics, 1960-1993, 1995 and SIPRI, Yearbook, various
years. Notes: 21 cases in regression.  The t-value for Civilian Public Consumption Expenditure is below 2.00
if Japan is excluded from the regression.
BASIC MODEL + FEDERALISM
FEDERALISM
Adj R2 = .697
Coefficient
-1.375
Standard Error
.714
t-Value
1.914
Sources: Federalism  is from Table 1. Notes: 21 cases in regression.
BASIC MODEL + CONSTITUTIONAL
STRUCTURE
CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE
Adj R2 = .731
Coefficient
-.411
Standard Error
.165
t-Value
2.499
Sources:  Constitutional Structure is from Table 1.  Notes: 21 cases in regression.  The t-value for  Civilian
Public Consumption Expenditure is below 2.00 if Japan is excluded from the regression.  The t-value for
Constitutional Structure  is below 2.00  if New Zealand is  excluded from the regression.
BASIC MODEL +  FISCAL
DECENTRALIZATION
FISCAL  DECENTRALIZATION
Adj R2 = .77
Coefficient
-.073
Standard Error
.023
t-Value
3.155
Sources  Fiscal Decentralization  is from Table 1.  Notes: 21 cases in regression.
BASIC MODEL + FISCAL
CENTRALIZATION
FISCAL CENTRALIZATION
Adj R2 = .809
Coefficient
.06
Standard Error
.015
t-Value
3.908
Sources :  Fiscal Centralization is from Table 1.  Notes: 21 cases in regression.
BASIC MODEL + FISCAL DIFFICULTY
FISCAL  DIFFICULTY
Adj R2 = .756
Coefficient
-26
Standard Error
.142
t-Value
1.834
Sources :  Fiscal Difficulty is from Table 1.  Notes: 20 cases in regression (no data for New Zealand ).
Turning now to our decentralization measures, we find that no less than
three - constitutional structure, fiscal decentralization and fiscal centralization -
are significantly associated with inflationary outcomes, with decentralization
once again conducive to superior post-war economic performance. While the
model specification including constitutional structure is lacking in robustness on
at least two counts, the models including the fiscal variables are quite satisfactory
on this score. Of the two robust models, the one including fiscal centralization
has somewhat the greater explanatory power, leaving us with the finding that
this variable features as the strongest of our measures in respect of both
economic growth and inflation.
Given that this measure is the one most closely associated with central bank
independence in Busch's 17-country data-set, it will be  tempting for some to
interpret this finding as supporting the view that bank independence provides
the crucial institutional basis for sound macro-economic performance. Whilst
that might possibly be the case, such an interpretation is not supported by the
data at our disposal. 17-nation regressions of economic growth and inflation
replicate the findings of the models including fiscal decentralization in Tables 4
and 5. Moreover, in each case, these models perform better than do specifications
in which central bank independence replaces fiscal centralization, with the bank
term having no effect  whatsoever in the growth model.2 This does not rule out
central bank independence as being a factor contributing to superior macro-
economic management in the post-war period, but it does suggest that it is far
from being the whole story.
Unemployment
The basic model for change in the level of unemployment between 1974/79 and
1990/94 as reported in Table 6 consists of four terms: corporatism, sectoral
transformation, Right cabinet incumbency and change in real earnings. The
hypotheses tested to derive this model highlight the potential influence on
labour market performance of a wide range of factors. They include productivity
growth, exposure to international trade, changes in employment composition,
part-time employment, inflation, real earnings growth, cultural factors
(including religious belief), union density, the institutionalization of class
conflict, partisan control of government, public expenditure development and
unemployment benefit replacement rates (see Castles, 1998).
Table 6: Unemployment  Models
BASIC MODEL
INTERCEPT
CORPORATISM
1974-1994 SECTORAL
TRANSFORMATION
1979-1993 CHANGE IN REAL
EARNINGS
1974-1994 RIGHT CABINET SEATS
Adj R2 = .844
Coefficient
4.345
-1.736
.34
1.808
-.091
Standard Error
.422
.082
.434
.016
t-Value
4.114
4.133
4.167
5.814
Sources : Unemployment from Table 3. Corporatism  scores from Crepaz (1993), with data for Greece,
Portugal and Spain supplied by Professor Hans Keman of the Free University of Amsterdam. 1974-1994
Sectoral Transformation is equivalent to the percentage of the employed population leaving the agricultural
sector, calculated from  OECD, Historical Statistics, 1960-1994, 1996. Average annual real change  in
hourly earnings in manufacturing  from  OECD, Historical Statistics, 1960-1993, 1995. 1974-1994 Right
Cabinet Seats  is equivalent to the average annual percentage of cabinet seats held by the major party of the
Right., with data  from Schmidt (1996a) and the definition of the major party of the Right according to
criteria in Castles (1982).  Notes: 18 cases in regression.
BASIC MODEL + FEDERALISM
FEDERALISM
Adj R2 = .832
Coefficient
-.274
Standard Error
.859
t-Value
.318
Sources: Federalism  is from Table 1. Notes: 21 cases in regression.
BASIC MODEL + CONSTITUTIONAL
STRUCTURE
CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE
Adj R2 = .831
Coefficient
-.036
Standard Error
.278
t-Value
.131
Sources:  Constitutional Structure is from Table 1.  Notes: 21 cases in regression.
BASIC MODEL +  FISCAL
DECENTRALIZATION
FISCAL  DECENTRALIZATION
Adj R2 = .831
Coefficient
-.002
Standard Error
.032
t-Value
.066
Sources  Fiscal Decentralization  is from Table 1.  Notes: 21 cases in regression.
BASIC MODEL + FISCAL
CENTRALIZATION
FISCAL CENTRALIZATION
Adj R2 = ..831
Coefficient
.003
Standard Error
.027
t-Value
.096
Sources :  Fiscal Centralization is from Table 1.  Notes: 21 cases in regression.
BASIC MODEL + FISCAL DIFFICULTY
FISCAL  DIFFICULTY
Adj R2 = .834
Coefficient
.133
Standard Error
.263
t-Value
.506
Sources :  Fiscal Difficulty is from Table 1.  Notes: 20 cases in regression (no data for New Zealand ).
We have already demonstrated an inverse relationship between post-war
inflation levels and corporatism. The negative association between corporatism
and unemployment in the basic model represents the other major plank of the
fashionable argument of the 1980s that labour quiescence through labour
discipline has brought major gains to working class movements in certain
countries (see eg Cameron, 1984; Crouch, 1985).  That the shift out of agriculture
produces unemployment as well as inflation is unlikely to be a source of
surprise, reflecting the difficulty of retraining an unskilled labour force for either
manufacturing or service occupations. The finding of a negative relationship
between unemployment growth and Right partisan control will be far more
controversial, but is interpreted (in Castles, 1998, 239) as a proxy for a variety of
policy initiatives promoted by the Right to underwrite the efforts of employers
"to create the basis for a more flexible or market-determined operation of labour
markets". That differences between nations in the trajectory of unemployment
growth will be, in part, a response to the relationship between real wages and
productivity is an argument which derives directly from the neoclassical model
(Gregory, 1993, 62).
When we turn to our five measures of decentralization, there is almost no
story to be told, because there are no significant findings to report. Perhaps, that
should occasion little comment. The only obvious linkage in the literature is via
the capacity of countries with low levels of fiscal difficulty to use Keynesian
demand management techniques to boost employment. We have
operationalized the fiscal difficulty measure on the tax side, whereas both
Scharpf and Busch provide measures for the expenditure side of the budget. It is,
therefore, possible that our lack of a significant finding for this variable is result
of discrepancies between the two measures, together with the obvious truth that
Keynesian strategies were built more around increasing public expenditure than
reducing taxation. However, comparing the few cases in which the variable has
been operationalized in expenditure terms with those same countries as shown
in the final column of Table 1, reveals no discrepancies of any magnitude. Were
this correspondence to be demonstrated widely across the full distribution of
OECD nations,3 it would seem to suggest that decentralization was unlikely to be
prominent in the list of the reasons why Keynesian policy intervention has
failed to rein in the growth of unemployment since the mid-1970s.
Social    Protection
Our final modelling exercise seeks to establish the basic determinants of
change in the size of the welfare state and further to establish whether
decentralization is amongst the factors influencing the growth of post-war social
protection.  Because the size of the state has been the foremost preoccupation for
more than two decades of comparative policy analysis, the list of potential
hypotheses to be investigated is longer even than in respect of the macro-
economic parameters of post-war political economy. For that listing the reader is
again referred to Castles (1998, 106-10).
In the case of change in total social protection, the basic model in Table 7
contains three terms: Right cabinet incumbency, change in the size of the aged
population and the extent of Catholic adherence. The Right incumbency finding
is a variant of the partisan control of government thesis, which numerous
studies since the late 1970s have replicated in various ways for different
measures of the size of government (for an excellent early discussion, see Shalev,
1983). The notion that social protection reflects needs and/or demands of the
aged has an even longer pedigree (see Wilensky, 1975; Pampel and Williamson,
1989) and is now an orthodoxy of policy advice at an international level (World
Bank, 1994; OECD, 1996a). The most straight-forward way to account for the fact
that countries with substantial Catholic populations have exhibited lower post-
war welfare growth than others is to contextualize the argument in terms of
Esping-Andersen's (1990) discussion of the Conservative world of welfare. The
Conservative world is largely a Catholic world (cf. van Kersbergen, 1995), in
which the welfare state emerged early and developed along social insurance
lines. Hence, the reason that Catholic welfare states grew relatively slowly
between 1960 and 1993 was that many of these countries were already amongst
the OECD's social expenditure leaders at the beginning of the period. In other
words, the Catholic coefficient in Table 7 is a catch-up coefficient.
Introducing the decentralization measures into our basic model is slightly
more complex than in previous instances. That is because the addition of
federalism to the basic model also makes it possible to locate a significant
negative relationship between post-war economic growth and the development
of the socially protective state. This latter effect stems from the fact that high
growth countries are in a position to expand their economies at lesser fiscal cost
in terms of revenue shares of GDP than more weakly performing nations (for an
early formulation of this hypothesis, see Wildavsky, 1975). Because several of the
federal nations in the OECD have experienced exceptionally low rates of post-war
economic growth, this general tendency only becomes apparent when we control
for this aspect of the institutional structure.  Economic growth does not interact
in the same way with other aspects of political and fiscal decentralization and,
consequently, our other measures are presented in the context of the basic three-
term model.
Apart from fiscal difficulty, all of the measures of decentalization emerge as
statistically significant. However, neither of the models featuring fiscal terms can
be accepted at face value. As we pointed out earlier in discussing issues relating
to the research design of this study, there is an endogeneity problem in linking
fiscal centralization with social expenditures. On the other hand, the fiscal
decentralization model, which does not suffer from this problem, is deeply
suspect on robustness grounds. Neither of the political decentralization models
are problematical on these count. Federalism is clearly the strongest of the two
political measures. This, obviously, owes something to the interaction of
economic growth and federalism which allows both terms to figure in the
successful model, but federalism would still be much the stronger of these two
measures if it simply replaced constitutional structure in the three-term basic
model. These findings suggest that what matters for the growth of the socially
protective state is political rather than fiscal decentralization and that what
matters most of all is the presence or absence of a federal division of powers.
Table 7: Social Protection Models
BASIC MODEL
INTERCEPT
1960-1993 RIGHT CABINET SEATS
CATHOLICISM
1960-1993 CHANGE IN AGED
POPULATION
Adj R2 = .811
Coefficient
19.497
-.191
-.054
1.196
Standard Error
.026
.02
.425
t-Value
7.369
2.693
2.814
Sources: Increase Total Social Protection from Table 3. 1960-1993 Right Cabinet Seats  is equivalent to the
average annual percentage of cabinet seats held by the major party of the Right., with data  from Schmidt
(1996) and the definition of the major party of the Right according to criteria in Castles (1982).  Catholicism
is the percentage of the population baptised a non-Protestant Christian faith, with  data from Barrett (1982)
and is for the late 1970s/very early 1980s. 1960-1993 Change in the Aged Population is the change in the
percentage of the population of 65 years and over, with data from  OECD (1993) and OECD (1995). 17 cases
in regression.
BASIC MODEL + ECONOMIC
GROWTH AND FEDERALISM
1960-1993 GROWTH RATE OF REAL
GDP PER CAPITA
FEDERALISM
Adj R2 = .962
Coefficient
-1.541
-4.79
Standard Error
.43
.658
t-Value
3.585
7.284
Sources:  1960-1992 Growth Rate of Real GDP Per Capita from Table 3. Federalism  is from Table 1. Notes:
17 cases in regression.
BASIC MODEL + CONSTITUTIONAL
STRUCTURE
CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE
Adj R2 = .873
Coefficient
-.725
Standard Error
.268
t-Value
2.702
Sources:  Constitutional Structure is from Table 1.  Notes: 17 cases in regression.
BASIC MODEL +  FISCAL
DECENTRALIZATION
FISCAL  DECENTRALIZATION
Adj R2 = .91
Coefficient
-.151
Standard Error
.039
t-Value
3.899
Sources  Fiscal Decentralization  is from Table 1.  Notes: 17 cases in regression.
BASIC MODEL + FISCAL
CENTRALIZATION
FISCAL CENTRALIZATION
Adj R2 = .859
Coefficient
.085
Standard Error
.036
t-Value
2.342
Sources :  Fiscal Centralization is from Table 1.  Notes: 17 cases in regression.  The t-value of Fiscal
Centralization is below 2.00 if any one of New Zealand, the USA or Germany are excluded from the
regression. The t-value of Catholicism is below 2.00 if Greece is excluded from the regression.
BASIC MODEL + FISCAL DIFFICULTY
FISCAL  DIFFICULTY
Adj R2 = .845
Coefficient
-.43
Standard Error
.295
t-Value
1.46
Sources :  Fiscal Difficulty is from Table 1.  Notes: 16 cases in regression (no data for New Zealand ).
The Conclusions
There are only three points I wish to make here. The first is that political
and fiscal decentralization is not a topic of purely academic interest.
Governments initiate centralization of functions, devolve their powers and
promote tax reform programs.  Governments also tread a tight-rope of satisfying
demands for greater social protection whilst heeding calls for a leaner meaner
state, and they would all like to find more optimal trade-offs between macro-
economic policy objectives. So if changes of the former type could make the latter
kinds of policy dilemmas easier to resolve, it would matter not merely in the
sense that we would know more, but in the sense that we could, as a community,
do more.
A dramatic instance of what is potentially at stake is the finding here that
fiscal centralization is significantly associated with a weaker record of post-war
economic growth and with poorer inflation outcomes. These outcomes can be
quantified. If the implications of our models are taken at face value, we can say
that, if the United Kingdom had been characterized by the OECD average level of
fiscal centralization (ie. if the level of fiscal centralization had been on average 16
percentage points lower across the post-war era), that country would have
experienced a post-war economic growth rate on average .27 percentage points
higher and an average post-war inflation rate .97 points lower than was actually
the case. Countries like New Zealand, Ireland and Australia, with still more
centralized fiscs, would have stood to make proportionately greater gains. If the
positive relationship between fiscal centralization and social protection shown in
Table 7 is discounted because of its lack of robustness, these economic
performance gains might be seen as being costless in terms of human welfare. If
they are not, the calculated cost, again using the United Kingdom as example,
would have been a lesser increase in post-war social protection of 1.36 percentage
points of GDP.
Clearly, if demonstrated, the trade-off between economic performance and
welfare implied here is one which would be grabbed by most contemporary
OECD governments with both hands. My second point, however, is that the
findings here are quite inadequate for demonstrating such relationships to the
satisfaction of any sane policy-maker. The modelling we have undertaken is
designed to be exemplary rather than comprehensive. We have been discussing
big aggregates of data for long aggregates of time. From our analysis above, we do
not know whether relationships that apply to social protection as a whole apply
to its component elements and we do not know whether relationships which
characterize the period as a whole characterize its separate parts.4There would
seem good reasons to suppose that the magnitude of the effects with which we
are concerned will have been at their greatest during the periods when the cross-
national variances of particular performance parameters were at their greatest:
economic growth before the First Oil Crisis, inflation from the mid-70s to the
mid-80s, unemployment today and the growth of social protection in the 1970s
and 1980s. If that is so, the relevance to present-day policy-makers of our various
findings will depend on whether the story told by reading the entrails of long-
term outcomes is picking up on contemporary effects or on ones long since dead
and buried.
So why a study of long-term aggregates, if long-term aggregates offer us little
relevant in the way of immediate policy implications, and the answer is to
stimulate further research. It is axiomatic that much of that research effort should
be empirical: that we should systematically disaggregate into policy components
and time-periods and establish within what parameters political and fiscal
decentralization is relevant to policy outcomes. My third point, however, is that,
in this instance, theoretical work is a no lesser priority. In the case of the 'politics
matters' paradigm, the mechanism of policy impact was, in crude outline,
obvious enough. Voters choose candidates, at least partly, on the basis of their
policy platforms, so class and party preferences translate into legislated
expenditure programs. The mechanisms by which decentralization impacts on
outcomes are far less transparent. Nowhere is this truer than in respect of the
linkages between fiscal arrangements and economic performance. Usually in the
field of comparative public policy analysis, theory suggests the hypotheses that
require empirical testing.  If some of the relationships located here pass the test of
a more detailed empirical analysis, it will be time to reverse the process and
demand of theory answers to the question of how decentralization matters.
Endnotes
1 Post-war Strike Coefficient = -93.382 - 174.475 (51.129) Corporatism + 22.445  (4.827) 1960-1993
Sectoral Transformation. Adj R2 = .594. 21 cases in regression. Figures in parentheses are
standard errors. The strike coefficient is  defined as the number of working days lost per 1,000
employees in non-agricultural sectors of the economy and is calculated for the period 1967 to
1992 from  ILO,      Yearbook of Labour Statistics   , various years.
2  1960-1992  Economic Growth = 6.381 - .0004411 (.00005356) 1960 Real GDP Per Capita -.018 (.006)
Fiscal Centralization.  Adj R2= .815.
1960-1992  Economic Growth = 4.812 - .0004275 (.00006231) 1960 Real GDP Per Capita + 212
(.114) Central Bank Independence. Adj R2 = .648.
1960-1993 Inflation =  .274  - .727  (.185) Corporatism + .09 (.024) 1960-1993 Sectoral
Transformation + .239 (.057) 1960-1993 Civilian Public Consumption Expenditure + .053 (.011)
Fiscal Centralization. Adj R2= .797.
1960-1993 Inflation = .6.17 - .541  (.213) Corporatism + .067 (.025) 1960-1993 Sectoral
Transformation + .176 (.064) 1960-1993 Civilian Public Consumption Expenditure - .959 (.227)
Central Bank Independence. Adj R2 = .772.
Notes to equations: 17 cases in all regressions. Figures in parentheses are standard errors. Source
for central bank independence coding is Busch, 1993,  60.
3 Such discrepancies will occur where there is Vertical Fiscal Imbalance (VFI),  ie. where central
governments levy  a higher proportion of taxes than they spend, passing on revenues to be spent
at lower levels. Where VFI is high, as in Australia,  it means that the fiscal difficulty of
central governments will be higher on the expenditure than the tax side of the budget. It seems
quite probable that a measure of the ratio of the relative ease  with which central governments
may boost public expenditure  as compared with initiating  tax cuts could explain a great deal
about some countries' post-war policy development.
4 My earlier work (Castles 1998) provides a more detailed analysis of aspects of the size and
growth of the state using measures of political, but not fiscal, decentralization. It shows that
constitutional structure is an important factor shaping both the total outlays of receipts of
government and also a strong influence on public spending on education. Federalism impacts on
social security transfers spending.  The influence of both of these measures is experienced in the
post-First Oil Crisis world and not before.
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